The collapse of the rationale for the Iraq war, acknowledged by former presidential press secretary Scott McClellan, has been an unsettling experience for all Americans. It has been especially so for those who consider themselves conservatives.

The war's cost -- in blood, treasure, and world opinion -- has been horrendous.

That the reasons for which it ostensibly was waged were dubious, and arguably spurious, is especially disheartening.

That the famous weapons of mass destruction did not exist, and that evidence for their existence was less than persuasive all along, troubles even Republican loyalists.

Fortunately, two recent books -- both from limited-government perspectives that political conservatives will find congenial -- might help them find their way back to more solid ground.

IN AIN'T MY America: The Long, Noble History of Antiwar Conservatism and Middle American Anti-Imperialism, published by Henry Holt in April, Bill Kauffman shows that for most of two centuries, from George Washington to Robert A. Taft, conservatives were highly skeptical of foreign wars.

In fact, conservatives were skeptical of war itself. Thomas Jefferson (claimed by right and left) opposed "entangling alliances" precisely because they lead to war.

"In pre-imperial America," Kauffman writes, "conservatives objected to war and empire out of jealous regard for personal liberties, a balanced budget, the free enterprise system, and federalism."

The Framers deliberately restricted presidential power. The president was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but, under the same Constitution that conferred that authority on him, he was to use those forces only when instructed to do so by Congress. Only Congress could declare war.

As Gene Healy demonstrates in The Cult of the Presidency: America's Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power, published by the Cato Institute in May, conservatives historically resisted the expansion of executive power.

The enthusiasm for presidential primacy began, for the most part, during the Progressive Era. Those who claimed ever-greater authority in the executive branch were, in the main, liberal Democrats.

From Woodrow Wilson through Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson, Democratic presidents claimed ever-greater power, as self-described liberal and progressive intellectuals cheered. (That the "imperial presidency" might be dangerous was discovered by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., one of those intellectuals, only when a Republican, Richard Nixon, took office.)

THROUGHOUT the nation's first 100 years, however, the belief that presidents should not be able to involve the nation in war held sway. Even Abraham Lincoln (no advocate of "appeasement," as Virginians know well) opposed "pre-emptive" war.

"Allow the president to invade a neighboring nation whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion," Lincoln wrote, "and you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose, and you allow him to make war at pleasure."

This, the Framers knew, would be a mistake. For many decades, conservatives agreed.

Over time, however, especially after they alone held out in support of the Vietnam War, conservatives came to defend not only that particular war, but war itself. They also embraced the war-making powers of the presidency. To express doubt, especially after 9/11, was unpatriotic. To some, it was tantamount to treason.

Many patriotic Americans are only now realizing that powers they believed the president needed to protect the country were used, instead, to maneuver it into another long, bloody, and -- as is now clear -- unnecessary war.

Conservatives who feel disoriented by this experience, or even betrayed, need not despair.

They can read Kauffman and Healy. Their fine books demonstrate persuasively and with good humor that conservatism has not always required worship at the altar of the presidency or unquestioned support of presidents' wars.

This "other" conservatism, as both authors argue, merits rediscovery and revival.
Alan Pell Crawford is the author of 'Twilight at Monticello: The Final Years of Thomas Jefferson,' published in January by Random House. Contact him at Acrawford@aimmedia.com.